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Protective Orders Against the Press and the
Inherent Powers of the Courts
In Sheppard v. Maxwell' the Supreme Court held that a defendant
in state court has a due process right to a trial free from excessive prej-
udicial publicity. Since Sheppard many trial courts have attempted to
satisfy this constitutional mandate by issuing protective orders against
the press. 2 Typically a protective order enjoins the news media from
printing or broadcasting certain information about a pending criminal
case.3 Such orders are often broadly defined 4 and are generally issued
1. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
2. Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 55
(1976) (reporting knowledge of 174 protective orders issued since Sheppard). A study of
California practice, undertaken prior to Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976),
reported that "the press in California now suffers the imposition of these decrees in
virtually every newsworthy case." Warren & Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial: The "Gag
Order," A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 51, 56 (1972). See Younger, The
Sheppard Mandate Today: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 56 NEB. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977).
This Note does not treat protective orders restricting the comments of parties, their
attorneys, and court officers. Commentators have found the issuance of orders against
participants far less problematic than protective orders against the press. See ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING "tO
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss 95, 102-04 (1968) [hereinafter cited as REARDON REPORT]; THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE, PUBLICITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 24-25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY]; Stanga,
Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WSi.
& MARY L. REv. 1, 43 (1971). But see Warren & Abell, supra at 72-74 (theoretical justifica-
tion for distintion unclear; distinction unsound). Courts that have issued protective orders
against participants have relied on justifications that do not support the issuance of
protective orders against the press. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (consent of criminal defendants); State v.
'Woodahl, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2143 (Mont. Oct. 21, 1976) (per curiam) (same); State
v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965)
(professional responsibility of attorneys).
3. For a description of the types of information that have been subjected to protective
orders, see Landau, supra note 2, at 56.
4. For cases reviewing protective orders directed to any member of the press, see, e.g.,
United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972) (disapproving protective order
on First Amendment grounds); Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 168-69, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 246 (1973) (striking down on First Amendment grounds protection order against
press but not prosecutor); State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So.
2d 904 (Fla. 1977) (disapproving protective order on First Amendment grounds). But see
Wood v. Goodson, 253 Ark. 196, 485 S.W.2d 213 (1972) (directed to one reporter in court-
room); State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (per curiam), rev'd sub nora.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (directed to those members of media
over whom court had jurisdiction by reason of their intervention in criminal case).
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upon the initiative of the judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney with-
out an appearance by representatives of the press.5 The post-Sheppard
imposition of great numbers of "gag orders" has engendered a rising
debate on how best to reconcile the important values of free press and
fair trial.6
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart7 the Supreme Court con-
sidered for the first time the constitutionality of protective orders
against the press. The Nebraska Supreme Court, relying upon Shep-
pard, had upheld the issuance of a protective order in a much-publi-
cized murder trial.8 The United States Supreme Court reversed and
held that the state had not demonstrated danger to fair trial sufficient
to justify restrictions upon the press. The Court, however, employed a
test arguably weaker than that previously applied by courts when
evaluating restrictions upon the press.9 The Court stated that protec-
tive orders were not per se unconstitutional:
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility
of showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess
the requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint. This Court
5. E.g., Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 148, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1973)
(striking down protective order against press on First Amendment grounds but upholding
protective order against public prosecutor on basis of courts' inherent powers); Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966) (disapproving pro-
tective order on First Amendment grounds). But see, e.g., State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783,
236 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976) (press makes appearance; affirming protective order issued by lower
court); Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 818, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875 (1973)
(same; disapproving protective order on First Amendment grounds).
6. See, e.g., REARDON REPORT, supra note 2; Judicial Conf. of the United States, Report
of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue,
in 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KAUFMAN REPORT]; SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO,
TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967) (Final Report and Rec-
omnendations) [hereinafter cited as MEDINA REPORT]; TwENTm'm CENTURY, supra note
2; Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60 (1976) (discussing ABA response
to challenge to develop standards).
7. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
8. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
9. Although courts have generally employed the Holmes-Brandeis version of the
"clear and present danger" test in evaluating judicial restrictions upon the press, e.g.,
Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 826, 829-30, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 881, 884
(1973), the Nebraska Press Association Court adopted Learned Hand's version of the
test: "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See 427 U.S. at 562. Some observers contend
that the Hand formulation offers far less protection for speech than the Holmes-Brandeis
version. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 62-65 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREFDOM OF ExPRESSION 114 (1970); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior
Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 541 (1977); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An
Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 460-61 (1977).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 342, 1977
has frequently denied that First Amendment rights are absolute
and has consistently rejected the proposition that a prior restraint
can never be employed.10
The issuance of protective orders burdens basic First Amendment
rights. Even if struck down on appeal, a protective order bars the press
from publishing news during the pendency of the appeal. By the time
the order is vacated, moreover, the information may no longer be
newsworthy.11 Finally, the press may refrain from publishing certain
information in order to avoid the issuance of a broad protective order.
12
Notwithstanding this interference with First Amendment rights, the
Nebraska Press Association decision did not end the issuance of pro-
tective orders: trial courts have continued to enjoin the press, and
state supreme courts have continued to uphold protective orders.'
3
10. 427 U.S. at 569-70.
11. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1976); State ex rel. Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (Fla. 1977) ("News delayed is
news denied."); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975) ("A criminal statute
chills, prior restraint freezes.") This problem is particularly severe because of the "Dick-
inson doctrine": that a protective order is later shown to have been invalid does not
constitute a defense to subsequent contempt charges based on the press's violation of the
order. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509-11, 514 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Walker
v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); remanding for redetermination of appro-
priateness of contempt in light of unconstitutionality of gag order). On remand, the
district court in Dickinson refused to disturb the convictions. United States v. Dickinson,
349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 979 (1973).
12. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 608-11 & n.40 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (chilling effect especially severe for small newspapers).
13. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 555 P.2d 1286 (Okla. 1976),
rev'd per curiam, 97 S. Ct. 1045 (1977).
In a recent symposium reviewing the Nebraska Press Association decision, the contribu-
tors generally agreed that few if any prior restraints on the press would be upheld on
appeal. E.g., Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from, Sheppard to Nebraska Press As-
sociation: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 409
n.72 (1977); Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, id. at 411, 411-12;
Schmidt, supra note 9, at 469; Younger, Some Thoughts on the Defense of Publicity
Cases, 29 STAN. L. REV. 591, 603 (1977). Nonetheless, many contributors argued that
Nebraska Press Association acknowledged that some prior restraints might meet the
constitutional standard as determined on a case-by-case basis. Erickson, Fair Trial and
Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, id. at 485, 489, 491-95; Franklin, Untested Assump-
tions and Unanswered Questions, id. at 387, 390; Sack, supra at 412; Schmidt, supra note
9, at 461, 465; Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the
Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515, 515
(1977). This reading of Nebraska Press Association may well encourage a trial judge to
think that his is such a case. See Erickson, supra at 489-90; Schmidt, supra note 9, at 470.
For a similar argument, see Younger, supra note 2, at 18-19.
One contributor to the symposium suggested that in practice Nebraska Press Associa-
tion would probably make any protective order against the press constitutionally im-
permissible, even though the Supreme Court specifically rejected such a holding. See
Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497, 497-98, 504-05, 518 (1977). Nonetheless,
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Even when higher courts have vacated protective orders, they have
indicated that the decision was not an easy one to reach.14 Courts are
likely to persist in issuing protective orders so long as the standard
of review admits that certain situations may justify such orders.
In reaching its decision in Nebraska Press Association the Supreme
Court evaluated the validity of the protective order in question in
terms of the conflict between the First Amendment guarantee of free
press and the Sixth Amendment right to fair trial before an impartial
jury.15 Most courts have examined the propriety of protective orders
in these terms.' In doing so, the courts usually have invoked Sheppard
and the Sixth Amendment to justify protective orders. The courts
seem to assume either that the Sixth Amendment directly grants them
the authority to issue protective orders or that the constitutional
obligation to provide a fair trial warrants invocation of the courts'
inherent powers.
17
This Note analyzes both assumptions. It shows that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the sources of the fair trial obligation, do not
grant the courts authority to use whatever means they deem necessary
to meet that obligation. Further, the Note demonstrates that protective
orders exceed the scope of inherent judicial powers as defined in other
contexts.' 8 It argues that this lack of judicial self-restraint both violates
American norms regarding the proper role of the judiciary and is
likely to lead to decisions that cannot withstand careful scrutiny. Con-
sequently, the Note concludes that courts should develop and articulate
even this contributor warned that some trial judges would probably continue to issue
protective orders. Not only may such judges misinterpret Nebraska Press Association, but
others may recognize that by the time the order is overturned it will have achieved its
purpose of suppressing publicity. See id. at 511-13. For a similar argument, see Younger,
supra note 2, at 18-19.
14. E.g., State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla.
1977); Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundsen, 248 NAV.2d 493 (Iowa 1976)
(overturning protective order enjoining publishing of names of jurors in murder trial).
15. 427 U.S. at 547, 570.
16. E.g., State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 908
(Fla. 1977); State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 783-84, 236 N.W.2d 794, 796 (1975) (per
curiam), rev'd sub nora. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
17. Similarly, Warren and Abell note that studies concerning the problem of pretrial
publicity have assumed that courts have authority to issue protective orders against the
press. Warren & Abell, supra note 2, at 73 & n.97.
18. In 1924 Frankfurter and Landis observed that "the accumulated weight of repeti-
tion behind such a phrase as 'inherent powers' of the lower Federal courts is a constant
invitation to think words instead of things. It is imperative, therefore, to subject it to
critical scrutiny." Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contenipts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REv. 1010, 1022-23 (1924).
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a new theory of inherent powers if they are to continue to issue pro-
tective orders against the press.1 9
I. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as Sources of Authority
Most courts do not explicitly identify the source of authority for the
issuance of protective orders. Instead, they simply refer to the Shep-
pard obligation to provide fair trials.2 0 Courts apparently assume that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, from which the fair trial
obligation derives, grant courts authority to issue protective orders. An
inference of such authority from the amendments is untenable.
First, there is no support for this inference in the Sheppard decision.
The Supreme Court did not suggest in Sheppard that the judiciary's
obligation to provide fair trials gave it powers beyond those tradition-
ally exercised. The Court recommended instead that fair trials be
secured through the use of traditional judicial powers such as sequestra-
tion, voir dire, change of venue, and continuances. 2 The Court did not
rule on the propriety of issuing protective orders.
22
19. Alternatively, some commentators have suggested that the legislature could grant
the courts authority to issue protective orders against the press. See T. TAYLOR, Two
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 162 (1969); Barist, The First Amendment and
Regulation of Prejudicial Publicity-An Analysis, 36 FORDHA.t L. REV. 425, 451 (1968).
20. See Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 824-25, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 880
(1973) (Sheppard has been utilized as broad sanction for judicial power to provide fair
trials, though high courts have "severely limited" judicial power to issue protective orders
on First Amendment grounds); T. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 127, 159 (judicial sensitivity
to publicity concerning trial in part consequence of Sheppard).
21. The Sheppard Court observed: "Since he viewed the news media as his target, the
[trial] judge never considered other means that are often utilized to reduce the appearance
of prejudicial material and to protect the jury from outside influence." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966). Specifically, the Court recommended:
But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestra-
tion of the jury was something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel.
If publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial
should be ordered.
Id. at 363. The Nebraska Press Association Court noted that "when this Court has
reversed a state conviction because of prejudicial publicity, it has carefully noted that
some course of action short of prior restraint would have made a critical difference."
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976). The Court concluded that the
Sleppard Court had vacated the conviction "[blecause the trial court had failed to use
even minimal efforts to insulate the trial and the jurors from the 'deluge of publicity
..' Id. at 554.
22. 384 U.S. at 362-63. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 505-07 (5th Cir.
1972) (stating that Sheppard did not reach issue of propriety of protective orders);
Younger, supra note 2, at 7-8 (same). See also A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND
PUBLIcITY 244-45 (1967) (quoting Justice Clark, author of majority opinion, indicating that
Sheppard "never mentioned any guidelines for the press"). The Sheppard Court did
suggest that the trial "judge should have at least warned the newspapers to check the
346
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Second, apart from the Sheppard holding, the inference of judicial
authority from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is unacceptable
because it sets no apparent bounds. The amendments, according to this
view, could be offered as authority for almost any exercise of power
that would aid courts in providing fair trials. For example, courts could
argue that the fair trial obligation would justify issuance of a protective
order against ministers' preaching sermons that label the defendant as
guilty. Moreover, interpreting the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
as sources of authority for protective orders against the news media
runs counter to the fundamental principle that the obligation to pro-
vide fair trials rest upon the government, not upon private individ-
uals.
23
The importance of the latter consideration is illustrated by Chicago
Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune
Co.2 4 There, the district court rejected the claim that the First Amend-
ment as incorporated through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed an individual's right of access to private news-
papers. Noting that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not protect
against wrongs done by private persons, '23 the court concluded that
the due process clause did not grant individuals rights against other
individuals. Rather, the court suggested that authority for an access re-
quirement would have to come either from legislation or from a con-
stitutional amendment.
Third, as Chicago Joint Board also suggests, 26 imposing on the press
the obligation to provide for fair trials appears inconsistent with the
First Amendment mandate that the press remain an independent check
upon the conduct of the government. The constitutional obligation to
accuracy of their accounts." 384 U.S. at 360. But the Court observed, "[oif course, there
is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the court-
room." Id. at 362-63.
23. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 588 n.15 (1976) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in judgment) (noting difference between private law applicable to press and
governmental obligations); Sack, supra note 13, at 419; Comment, Gagging the Press in
Criminal Trials, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 608, 612-13 (1975) (footnotes omitted):
Any power of the court to gag the press cannot be derived from the sixth amend-
ment. The individual liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the four-
teenth amendment govern relationships between individuals and government . ...
The amendments thus neither provide the source of any right against other in-
dividuals . . . nor compel or justify governmental action to protect the individual's
right against other private individuals.
24. 307 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. 111. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 973 (1971).
25. Id. at 425.
26. Id. at 429.
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provide for fair trials should not be read to require the press to become
an appendage of the courts.
2 7
II. The Inherent Powers of Courts
A. Judicial Reliance upon Inherent Powers
Judicial reliance upon Sheppard when issuing protective orders is
subject to a second interpretation. The courts may be assuming that
the obligation to provide fair trials warrants exercise of their inherent
powers. In 1973 a California appellate court, though vacating a protec-
tive order on First Amendment grounds, explicitly asserted that "[t]he
jurisdiction of courts to make pretrial protective orders rests squarely
on their implied and inherent powers." 28 Further support for this in-
terpretation comes from the repeated references in protective order
cases to "contempt by publication" decisions.29 In these decisions a
court holds in contempt a representative of the news media who has
reported information that the court later concludes prejudiced pend-
ing litigation.30 Because contempt by publication is one type of exer-
27. Justice Stewart has written:
[T]he Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing business
is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional
protection.
In setting up the three branches of the Federal Government, the Founders de-
liberately created an internally competitive system ...
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was a similar
one; to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check
on the three official branches.
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975). See Sack, supra note 13, at
416-20.
28. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 156, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1973) (striking
down protective order against press on First Amendment grounds but upholding protective
order against public prosecutor). See United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 28 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (court's inherent powers to take
strong measures to provide fair trial form basis for protective order); cf. Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 206-07, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 437-38 (1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976) (inherent power to issue protective order against participants and to
seal grand jury transcript); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N.E.2d
127, 145-46 (Ohio 1976) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (inherent power to close courtroom).
29. E.g., Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 824-25, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 880
(1973) (discussing contempt by publication cases that acknowledge judicial power to use
that device within strict First Amendment limits); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282
N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972) (same).
30. For the leading discussion of the relationship between contempt by publication
and the inherent powers of the judiciary, see Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in
the United States (pt. 2), 28 COLUM . L. REv. 525, 536-37 (1928). The first part of the
study appears at 28 COLUM. L. Rrv. 401 (1928).
Although some courts rely upon the contempt by publication doctrine, in reality it
offers scant support for the issuance of protective orders. First, though contempt by
publication has traditionally been justified as an inherent power, it may well be, as will
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cise of the courts' inherent powers, judges citing such cases appear
implicitly to base their authority to issue protective orders upon the
inherent powers of courts.
B. The Theory of the Inherent Powers of Courts
31
The courts have traditionally held that their very existence entails
authority to exercise powers necessary to the fulfillment of the ju-
diciary's institutional mission. This authority does not derive from
be described below, that the power is based on an historical mistake. Moreover, even in
states that still accept the broad use of contempt, "a consistent line of U.S. Supreme
Court cases [based upon application of the clear and present danger test] has, as a
practical matter, made contempt by publication a dead letter." McCarthy, Fair Trial and
Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for Reform, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 79, 92 (1965). See MEDINA
REPORT, supra note 6, at 3; T. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 161; Ely, Trial by Newspapers
and Its Cures, ENCOUNTER, Mar. 1967, at 81, 89. For cases finding no clear and present
danger warranting contempt by publication, see, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
273-78 (1941); Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1948), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). Worcester Telegram & Gazette, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354
Mass. 578, 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968), illustrates how disfavored contempt by publication has
become. Although the Supreme Judicial Court admitted that "[t]he publication con-
stituted a gross interference with the defendants' right to a fair trial," id. at 580, 238
N.E.2d at 863, the court reversed the media contempt convictions on the grounds that the
publishers lacked the specific intent or "wilful design to affect the trial." Id. at 582, 238
N.E.2d at 864.
Beyond its moribund condition, the contempt by publication doctrine rests upon weak
historical foundations. Blackstone incorporated into his Commentaries a fellow judge's,
Mr. Justice Wilmot's, mistaken view that English courts had traditionally employed con-
tempt by publication. See A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 22, at 277. American
and English courts studiously followed the Commentaries, including its misguided ac-
ceptance of contempt by publication. Id. Friendly and Goldfarb's analysis relies upon
the account in J. Fox, THE HIsToRY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1-43 (1927).
31. The usage "inherent powers" in this Note also corresponds to what many courts
have referred to as "implied powers." Courts have not demarcated a precise boundary
between the two terms and indeed have used them interchangeably. See, e.g., United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297
(1972) (analyzing discussion of "implied" powers in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), in terms of "inherent" powers).
Although this Note will focus upon the inherent powers of courts, it should be noted
that the other branches of government also possess inherent powers. For cases discussing
the inherent power of the President, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587-89 (1952) (presidential inherent power does not extend to taking over private
steel mills); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890) (presidential function includes rights,
duties, and obligations "implied by the nature of the government under the Constitu-
tion"); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
407 U.S. 297 (1972) (executive inherent powers do not legitimate wiretapping without
judicial warrant). For a case discussing the inherent power of Congress, see Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917). The Marshall Court wrote:
it must be borne in mind that the power [of legislative contempt] rests simply upon
the implication that the right has been given to do that which is essential to the
execution of some other and substantive authority expressly conferred. The power is
therefore but a force implied to bring into existence the conditions to which con-
stitutional limitations apply. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. Hence
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specific statutory or constitutional provisions; it inheres in the nature
of the judicial institution. Courts and commentators, therefore, often
refer to these institutionally derived powers as "inherent powers. ' 32
As early as 1812, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of
inherent powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because
they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far [as necessary]
our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from
statute."3 3 State courts have recognized similar powers. For example,
in concluding that justices of the peace possessed the inherent power
to punish for contempt, the Vermont Supreme Court observed in
1858: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature
and constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute,
but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary to the
existence of all other powers."3
4
Justification for a number of well-established judicial exercises of
power derives from the institutional needs of courts rather than from
specific constitutional or statutory provisions. These exercises of in-
herent powers may be divided into three categories: (1) the power to
procure buildings, supplies, and personnel, including the power to
call upon citizens to serve their public duty as witnesses; (2) the power
to make rules for the judicial system, including those governing prac-
tice and procedure, the unauthorized practice of law, and decorum;
and (3) the power to hold persons in contempt.
The reach of inherent judicial powers is determined by the courts
themselves. Because the judicial function can be defined broadly, the
courts could establish very expansive inherent powers. Courts have
recognized, however, that they must be cautious when defining and
exercising their inherent powers. 35 Abuse of inherent powers may
32. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *286; Barth, Background Paper, in TWEN-
riETlH CENTURY, supra note 2, at 49; cf. Starbuck, Organizational Growth and Develop-
ment, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 451, 463 (J. March ed. 1965) ("The importance of
survival to an organization cannot be overstated . . . . [The organization] may not do
many things. But one thing which it must do, if it is to be an organization at all, is
survive.")
33. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (dictum) (courts may
"fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce the observance of order"). The
Supreme Court, while recognizing the existence of some inherent powers in Hudson,
rejected a claim that the inherent powers give the federal courts nonstatutory jurisdic-
tion o er criminal conduct. For a leading American case predating Hudson which
recognized inherent judicial powers, see Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395, 416-17 (N.Y. 1811)
(opinion of Senator Platt) (contempt power).
34. In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1858). See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341
(1858) (contempt power "is a power inherent in all courts of record, and coexisting with
them by the wise provisions of the common law").
35. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)
(contempt power must be strictly restricted so courts do not nullify constitutional pro-
350
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engender disrespect toward all judicial exercises of power. Public
criticism of judicial excess is likely to be especially severe where in-
herent powers are concerned, since the scope of such powers is defined
by the courts themselves.
36
Courts thus have recognized two types of restrictions upon their in-
herent powers. First, substantive constitutional provisions limit the
exercise of inherent powers. For example, the Supreme Court has held
that the due process and trial by jury clauses prevent the courts from
trying serious contempt cases before a judge as factfinder. 37 Similarly,
Nebraska Press Association held that the First Amendment limited-
though did not preclude-the issuance of protective orders against the
press. 33
Second, the courts have developed three additional limitations that
are not set forth in constitution or statute. These limitations are as
follows: (1) inherent powers may be used only when reasonably neces-
sary for the court to be able to function;39 (2) inherent powers may be
employed only to control the internal activities of the judicial system;
40
and (3) inherent powers may not be used in violation of the separation
of powers doctrine.
41
III. Limitations upon Inherent Judicial Powers
A. Reasonable Necessity
Before exercising inherent powers, courts have traditionally required
a showing of "reasonable necessity." 42 What is reasonably necessary
tections); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911) (contempt power
under federal contempt statute must be utilized cautiously so courts do not exert ex-
cessive power); Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 579, 87 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1949) (though
properly employed here, courts should limit their reliance upon inherent powers).
36. As the California Court of Appeal wrote:
The jurisdiction of courts to make pretrial protective orders rests squarely on their
implied and inherent powers. The necessity for such powers is well recognized. . . . At
the same time, we must recognize that the concept of implied and inherent powers
poses great dangers when, of necessity, their definition and application is in the
hands of those who wield them. . . .If, through lack of restraint and by attempting
to increase their powers unnecessarily, they lose the respect which makes them ef-
fective, they may soon find that, as a practical matter, even powers that are now
conceded to them, are unenforceable.
Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 156, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1973) (striking down
protective order against press as not meeting standard of necessity but upholding issuance
of protective order against public prosecutor on basis of inherent powers).
37. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 207-08 (1968).
38. 427 U.S. at 556-62.
39. See pp. 351-56 infra.
40. See pp. 356-61 infra.
41. See pp. 362-64 infra.
42. See J. Fox, supra note 30, at 203:
There can be no question that some powers are inherent in courts; power to insist
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differs among the three categories of inherent powers. For example,
the contempt power may be exercised only to sanction an actual block-
age of the courts, while the rulemaking power may be employed to
afford efficient judicial operations. But a common core underlies the
different formulations: courts may not exercise inherent powers
merely because their use would be convenient or desirable.
1. Procurement
Courts traditionally have limited their power to procure personnel,
buildings, and supplies to cases where such procurement is required
for the actual functioning of the courts.4 3 In 1969 the Michigan
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he test is not relative need, but practical
necessity."' 4" The court held that the Michigan Third Circuit could
hire a judicial assistant because judicial functioning would otherwise
be seriously impaired. The court disapproved judicial appointment of
additional law clerks, however, because "there is no practical necessity
at this time for additional law clerks . . . ." Similarly, in 1955 the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed a lower court's decision not to hear
evidence on the question of the necessity for more probate court space.
The court held that evidence should be taken because "inherent power
can not be exercised except for the acquisition of necessary as dis-
tinguished from desirable quarters and space.
' 46
on the provision of a roof to keep out the weather and suitable furniture and the
required officers, and power to preserve order by causing a disturber of the proceed-
ings to be removed from the Court, are self-evidently inherent powers; these are
necessaries without which the Court cannot do its work.
43. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 2.3, Commentary at 38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS]:
As a last resort for the protection of the judicial process, a court may have to
invoke its inherent power to order payment of the necessary and reasonable expenses
for the performance of its functions. . . .Unless it can do this, the court's ability to
function is wholly within the control of the other branches of government.
For a general discussion of the judicial power of procurement, see J. CARRIGAN, INHERENT
POWERS OF THE COURTS (National College of the State Judiciary, 1973).
44. Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383 Mich. 10, 23, 172 N.W.2d 436, 441
(1969), modified, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972)
(emphasis in original). In its 1971 rehearing of this case, the Michigan Supreme Court
modified its earlier decision by adopting the reasoning of two justices who had filed
separate opinions in the Court's initial hearing of the case. The modification strengthened
the inherent power basis of the court's earlier decision.
45. Id. at 24, 172 N.W.2d at 441.
46. State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 155, 126 N.E.2d 57, 61 (1955)
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1920) (upholding use
of inherent power to appoint auditor required for performance of judicial duties); Kirk
v. Baker, 224 So. 2d 311, 317-18 (Fla. 1969) (upholding use of inherent power to appoint
solicitor when state attorney allegedly took bribes).
It should be noted that courts have further limited the judicial procurement power
by requiring that they invoke their inherent power only after the legislature has refused
reasonable requests of the courts. Because the legislature has express budgetary power,
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Exercise of the subpoena power-used to "procure" witnesses and
evidence-has also been justified on the basis of reasonable necessity.
In 1808 Lord Ellenborough referred to the judiciary's institutional
need for the subpoena power: "The right to resort to means competent
to compel the production of written, as well as oral, testimony seems
essential to the very existence and constitution of a Court of Common
Law, which . . . could not possibly proceed with due effect without
them."4 7 Contemporary statutes48 often grant courts authority to sub-
poena, but the subpoena power remains grounded in courts' own in-
herent powers. The Supreme Court wrote in 1944 that "the power to
compel the production of [a union's] records . . . arises out of the




The rulemaking power of courts, when justified as an exercise of
inherent powers, must proceed only insofar as it provides for efficient
court functioning. Thus, rules of practice and procedure have been
upheld as reasonably necessary for efficient judicial proceedings. 50 Yet
courts have noted that rules of practice and procedure should be
created only "sparingly and when the need is apparent and pressing."'' 1
Rules that govern the practice of law ensure a supply of qualified court
officers, but such regulation is limited "to the extent that is reason-
ably necessary to the proper functioning of the judiciary. '' 52 Rules of
inherent powers of judicial procurement are not deemed necessary unless the legislature
fails adequately to supply the courts. See State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451
S.W,2d 99, 102 (Mo. 1970) (inherent powers should be used only when judicial needs not
supplied "by conventional methods"); J. CARRIGAN, supra note 43, at 3 (quoting Chief
Justice Milliken of Kentucky).
47. Amey v. Long, 103 Eng. Rep. 653, 658 (K.B. 1808). For American cases referring to
the necessity for the obligation to testify in court or before a grand jury, see note 76
infra.
48. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1985-1992 (West 1955); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1326-
1328c (West 1970).
49. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944) (union must produce papers
for grand jury; Fifth Amendment limited to natural persons).
50. E.g., Hare v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 678, 686 (D. Md. 1972)
(inherent power to create needed rules of pleading); People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 502,
201 N.W.2d 629, 635 (1972) (court creates right to preliminary hearing through exercising
inherent powers); State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 77-79, 275 P.2d
887, 889-90 (1954) (inherent power to authorize discovery measures without statute).
51. Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 579, 87 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1949) (approving rule
that judges could not appear before court as counsel in other criminal cases). See Ex
parle United States, 101 F.2d 870, 878 (7th Cir.), a~f'd by an equally divided court sub
norn. United States v. Stone, 308 U.S. 519 (1939) (upholding invocation of rule based on
inherent powers providing for dismissal of case).
52. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 407, 312 P.2d
998, 1003 (1957) (vacating trial court injunction against realtors preparing certain papers
on grounds that these activities part of brokerage activities, not lawyer's work). See, e.g.,
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courtroom decorum have been upheld as necessary to prevent disrup-
tion of judicial proceedings and to provide an atmosphere of fairness.- :
When such rules appear not to further efficient judicial operations,
however, the rules have been struck down. In Dorfman v. Meiszn er,5
for example, the Seventh Circuit held that photography could be
prohibited in parts of the courthouse where it would disrupt the
judicial proceedings. But the court invalidated a prohibition of pho-
tography in the courthouse lobby because the prohibition was not rea-
sonably necessary to protect the ability of the court to function.
3. Contempt55
Courts have generally required a very high level of necessity before
invoking the contempt power. Historically courts have viewed con-
tempt as an inherent power that derives from their institutional
Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 480, 101 S.W.2d 977, 983-84 (1937) (contempt for un-
authorized practice before commission since necessary for protection of court); Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 700, 251 P.2d 619, 622
(1952) (court possesses inherent power to restrain defendant from practicing law even
though defendant had not violated statute; court expresses "reluctance to exercise our
inherent power except when necessary, and then only with prudence").
53. E.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970) (removing disruptive defendant);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (photography in courthouse); In re Trials of
Pending and Future Criminal Cases, 306 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (Executive
Committee of Dist. Court) (security arrangements required by controversial trial of David
Dellinger),
In Wells v. Gilliam, 196 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Va. 1961) (footnote omitted), the
court noted:
It is well established that all courts have the inherent power to prescribe such
rules of practice and rules to regulate their proceedings and facilitate the administra-
tion of justice as they deem necessary. The power to maintain order, to protect itself
or its officers from being disturbed in the exercise of their functions, and the power
to punish individuals who fail to comply with the rules adopted by the court to that
end, are probably the most important of all inherent powers of a court, since such
powers are essential to the very existence of a court as a judicial tribunal.
54. 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970). For a decision discussing the limitation upon the
courts' power to ensure courtroom decorum by prohibiting sketching in the courtroom, see
United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1974).
The court found the rule overly broad both in terms of First Amendment analysis and
the use of the court's power:
Ordinarily the trial judge has extremely broad discretion to control courtroom
activity, even when the restriction touches on matters protected by the First Amend-
ment .... We are unwilling, however, to condone a sweeping prohibition of in-court
sketching when there has been no showing whatsoever that sketching is in any way
obtrusive or disruptive.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted). See State v. Van Bogart, 85 Ariz. 63, 67, 331 P.2d
597, 600 (1958) ("The methods [gagging defendant] employed by the court to maintain
order and dignity in the courtroom are commensurate with the necessities of each case.")
55. Limitations placed by courts upon their exercise of the contempt power are
particularly significant for appraising judicial control of the press because such control
"developed for the most part through judicial construction of the contempt power of
courts." A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDrARB, supra note 22, at 271.
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needs.56 Although statutes have for some time granted courts authority
to hold persons in contempt, 57 courts often determine the proper
scope of their contempt power by reference to the policy and history
of contempt rather than by close construction of statutory language.58
In fact, state courts have at times limited the exercise of their con-
tempt power even though the exercise was permissible under a state
statute. 9
The behavior that traditionally has been found to have met the
reasonable necessity standard and that has thus been subject to the
contempt power of courts can be divided into three types.60 First,
courts hold in contempt judicial officers who misbehave because the
courts contend that faithful performance of judicial duties is essential
for proper court functioning."1 Second, courts argue that obedience to
judicial orders is so crucial that violation of almost any judicial order
-even one later adjudged unconstitutional-interferes with judicial
functioning and thus warrants invocation of the contempt power.
62
Third, in cases that do not pertain to judicial officers or to violations
of preexisting court orders-for example, cases involving contempt by
publication-courts hold in contempt individuals whose behavior in
some measure interferes with judicial functioning.
56. See In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1858); R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 12-13
(1963) (development of contempt power in m~dieval England).
57. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
58. E.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-52 (1941); Holtzman v. Tobin, 78 Misc.
2d 8, 358 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Term 1974) (per curiam), rev'g 72 Misc. 2d 1050, 340 N.Y.S.2d
286 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
59. E.g., Holtzman v. Tobin, 78 Misc. 2d 8, 358 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Term 1974) (perjury
contempt only if obstruction); State v. Estill, 55 Wash. 2d 576, 349 P.2d 210 (1960) (perjury
contempt only if obstruction); In re Lehman, 256 App. Div. 677, 680, 11 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432
(1939) (unauthorized practice of law constitutes contempt only if "affront to the dignity
of the court"). Compare Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 416-19
(1918) with Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-52 (1941) (overruling Toledo Newspaper).
60. The three kinds of contempt are illustrated by the three subsections of the federal
contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970):
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment
... such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
For a detailed discussion of the different types of contempt, see R. GOLDFARB, supra note
56, at 46-100.
61. E.g., United States v. Garden Homes, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 644, 646 (D.N.H. 1956)
(attorney misappropriation of funds from receiver acting closely under supervision of
court held contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1970)); Robran v. People, 173 Colo. 378,
381-82, 479 P.2d 976, 977-78 (1971) (sheriff as officer of court held in contempt for
releasing prisoners who were refused bail by court).
62. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. Dickinson, 465
F.2d 496, 509-13 (5th Cir. 1972). The courts suggest that an exception might be made for
an order of "transparent invalidity." Id. at 509.
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In deciding the third category of cases, courts have differed on what
constitutes reasonable necessity. Some state courts have held that the
contempt power may in such cases be used only against a threat rea-
sonably calculated to interfere with judicial proceedings. 3 The
federal courts and other state courts have required a showing of actual
or threatened blockage of judicial functioning in order to ground a
finding of contempt.6' In Ex parte Hudgings, 5 for example, the trial
court had held in contempt a witness it believed had committed per-
jury. The Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction and con-
cluded that there had been no physical halt in the proceedings. Be-
cause the only purpose of contempt "is to secure judicial authority
from obstruction in the performance of its duties,"0' 0 only a physical
blockage posed a sufficient threat to the judiciary to warrant invoca-
tion of the court's contempt power.
0 7
B. Controlling the Judicial System
A second restraint that courts have placed on the exercise of inherent
powers is that such powers can only be used to control activities and
63. E.g., People v. Goss, 10 111. 2d 533, 538-39, 141 N.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1957) (per
curiam) (high level of necessity, though not obstruction, required; conviction overturned
on procedural grounds); Ex parte Craig, 150 Tex. Grim. 598, 608, 193 S.W.2d 178, 184
(1946) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 376 (1947) (contempt by
publication upheld since posed threat "reasonably calculated" to disrupt administration
of justice).
64. E.g., In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945) (perjury alone not contempt be-
cause no obstruction); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919) (same); Murer v.
Rogowski, 480 P.2d 853, 855 (Colo. App. 1971) (perjury not contempt when had not "im-
peded the forward progress of the judicial hearings"); Harbor Tank Storage Co. v.
Angelis, 85 N.J. Super. 92, 204 A.2d 13 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964), aff'd sub nom.
Harbor Tank Storage Co. v. LoMuscio, 45 N.J. 539, 214 A.2d 1 (1965) (no contempt since
false statement not obstruction of justice). See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 18, at
1022 (footnote omitted):
In doing their work, courts, like others, may encounter obstructions. They must,
therefore, be invested with incidental powers of self-protection. A clamor in a
court room may interrupt proceedings; a contumacious witness may halt a trial.
These are actual and not argumentative obstructions. Some action is necessary to
enable the court to proceed with its affairs. . . . This manifestation of a court's
activity is not a mystical emanation inhering in the unique nature of a court; it is
referable solely to the fact that a court has business in hand and must get on with it.
65. 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
Hudgings, like the other federal cases cited in reference to the contempt power, rests
in part upon the courts' interpretation of the federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401
(1970). The interpretation of this statute, and of its antecedents, by federal courts has
evolved in correspondence with changing judicial notions of the power of contempt. See
Hudon, Freedom of the Press Versus Fair Trial: The Remedy Lies with the Courts, 1
VAL. U.L. REV. 8, 16 (1966); Nelles & King, supra note 30, at 530-32. Compare Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918) (interpreting statute to extend to
misbehavior not in "presence" of court and not physically obstructive to court) with Nye
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1941) (overruling Toledo; holding that statute does
not extend to misbehavior not in "presence" of court).
66. 249 U.S. at 383.
67. Id.
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persons within the judicial system.68 This restraint derives from a
recognition of the judiciary's limited role to hear and decide cases. In
1835 Tocqueville observed that American courts had carefully re-
stricted their role, so that "an American judge can only pronounce a
decision when litigation has arisen, he is only conversant with special
cases, and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before
the court." 69 This limitation has been used to strike down court ac-
tions that appear nonjudicial. For example, in Webster Eisenlohr, Inc.
v. Kalodner7 0 a trial judge had appointed a special master to study
possible improprieties in a corporation's activities. The Third Circuit
held that the trial judge had exceeded his authority in appointing the
special master because no one had requested that the court adjudicate
the improprieties the master was to investigate. The Third Circuit
wrote:
No doubt a great deal goes on in the world which ought not to
go on .... [B]ut until the concept of judicial power is widened to
something quite different from what it now is courts will better
serve their public function in limiting themselves to the con-
troversies presented by parties in litigation.71
68. Compare Birmingham Bar Ass'n v. Phillips, 239 Ala. 650, 658-59, 196 So. 725, 733
(1940) (rehearing) (per curiam) (unauthorized practice of law out of court not contempt
and must be prosecuted through quo warranto since court not directly insulted) with
Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 478, 101 S.W.2d 977, 982 (1937) ("One who, in a representa-
tive capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or . . . performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law [and is thus subject to contempt sanction]." (emphasis
added)).
69. 1 A. DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEMiocRAcy IN AMERICA 103 (H. Reeve trans. 1841). To some
degree this limitation is required by constitutional provisions like the federal case or
controversy requirement, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 356 (1911); United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. 1960); San Francisco
Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 472
F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973). The court in San Francisco Tomorrow wrote:
The Constitution creates a tripartite system of government and limits the courts to
"cases and controversies" . . . . Most importantly, they are not given general visita-
torial jurisdiction over the other branches of government and their agencies, nor are
they given jurisdiction, sua sponte or otherwise, to order the proper execution of
every act of Congress.
This narrow scope also reflects the courts' recognition of their limited responsibilities
in the political system. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (courts may not
deal with moot issues since their power is limited to deciding questions that affect rights
of litigants before them); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 611 (1869) (court may only
evaluate constitutionality of legislative act in case since "[flit is the function of the
judiciary to interpret and apply the law to cases between parties as they arise for judg-
ment.").
70. 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944).
71. Id. at 320. Similarly, the Second Circuit held in In re Kuflik, 342 F.2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1965), that a trial judge could not scrutinize a retainer agreement between an at-
torney and client when neither party to the arrangement had asked the court to in-
tervene-even though the attorney and client were before the court litigating a different
issue. Cf. Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366, 370-71 (1874) (court cannot appoint receiver to
357
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Even when operating within their proper judicial role, courts have
further limited the exercise of inherent powers. Perhaps aware that
judicial powers must be exercised prudently if they are to be pre-
served 72 or that a court-created power should extend only so far as the
judicial process,73 courts have limited use of inherent powers to con-
trolling activities and persons within the judicial system. Generally,
the judicial system is interpreted to include conduct within the court-
house and court-authorized activities outside the courthouse, such as




This limitation is apparent in the context of judicial procurement,
where courts purchase materials and services for their own use. Courts
do not apply their inherent power to procure supplies and personnel
for other institutions. For example, one state supreme court has held
that courts could appoint necessary judicial assistants; however, the
court rejected judicial appointment of probation officers. The court
observed that probation officers would perform nonjudicial functions
and therefore the courts should not appoint them.70
2. Rulemaking
In exercising the rulemaking power, the courts adhere to the same
limitation of controlling only activities and persons within the judicial
oversee construction of building pursuant to contract adjudicated by court); 1 C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 110-11 (1926) (discussing early court's
view of itself as purely judicial body).
72. See pp. 350-51 supra.
73. Cf. C. WARREN, supra note 71, at 110-11.
74. See pp. 359-60 infra (discussion of judicial control of witnesses).
75. See note 68 supra.
76. Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969),
modified, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); cf. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197, cert. denied, 402
U.S. 974 (1971) ("Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel
payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its
mandated responsibilities ...if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent Branch of
our Government.")
One exception to the second limitation is the subpoena power, by means of which
courts can control an individual's activity outside the judicial system. Courts support this
exception on the ground that testifying in court is a duty of living within society. See,
e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) (plurality opinion) (tracing
power to compel testimony to Lord Hardwicke's statement that "[t]he public has a right
to every man's evidence"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) ("The
duty to testify has long been recognized as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his
Government."); State ex rel. Haugiland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 167, 168, 169 P.2d 706, 710
(1946) ("It is an inherent power of a court ... to compel witnesses to appear before it
and testify concerning any relevant facts . . . .Without such power, courts would cease
to function and causes presented to them could not be conducted.")
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system. Most rules of practice, procedure, and decorum remain within
this limitation, because they control how cases are heard in court.
This restraint on inherent judicial power becomes more apparent
when considering judicial unwillingness to regulate the activities of
persons not involved in a particular case before the court. Although
courts often make rules governing the conduct of bailbondsmen in
court,7" they deny their power to control the bondsmen's out-of-court
decisions.78 Thus, courts concede that they cannot force a bondsman to
act as surety for a particular defendant,79 even though the bondsman's
decision implicates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against exces-
sive bail.so Rather than exceeding the limits of their inherent power to
meet this obligation, courts attempt to ensure that eligible persons will
obtain release by adjusting judicial processes-for example, by reducing
bail amounts or by establishing nonmonetary bail.8 '
The same limitation can be seen in regard to judicial control of
witnesses. Just as courts can control the conduct of other trial partici-
pants and court officers, courts can require witnesses within the judicial
77. Concord Cas. &. Sur. Co. v. United States, 69 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1934) (court need
not accept bonds tendered by bailbondsman); Taylor v. Waddey, 206 Tenn. 497, 504, 334
S.W.2d 733, 736 (1960) ("So long as the court in the conduct of its business makes re-
quirements [pertaining to bailbondsmen] . .. and these requirements are reasonable ones,
. .. they clearly come within the reasonable police power and inherent power of these
courts."); Summit Fidelity & Sur. Co. v. Nimtz, 158 Neb. 762, 767-68, 64 N.W.2d 803, 807
(1954) (courts have inherent power to make rules of practice and procedure and thus to
control bondsmen in court).
78. See Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., con-
curring) ("[T]he professional bondsmen hold the keys to the jail in their pockets. They
determine for whom they will act as surety . . . . The court and the commissioner are
relegated to the relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of bail."); In re
Carter, 192 F.2d 15, 16 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951) (court cannot control
bondsman's out-of-court decisions).
79. See People v. Doe, Report of the Third February 1954 Grand Jury of New York
County to Hon. John A. Mullen (1956), reported in 17 LAW. GUILD REv. 149, 149 (1957)
("The bondsman may act on whim or caprice and his decision is not reversible either in
a court of law or by an administrative agency. The Supreme Court . . . cannot require
that a bondsman write a bail bond, no matter how arbitrarily the bondsman's refusal.");
Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 971 (1961) ("[The deci-
sion to release an accused may be overridden by the bondsman, a private individual
subject to none of the responsibilities or restraints imposed on the judiciary.") While the
courts lack inherent power to control the bondsman's private business practices, many
states have statutes controlling bondsmen as an incident of the police power. E.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-732 (1947) (authorizing presiding judge to regulate bondsman); see
O'Rourke & Carter, The Connecticut Bail Commission, 79 YALE L.J. 513 (1970) (describing
Connecticut effort to minimize impact of private bondsman's discretion).
80. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952). The
states generally adhere to the same doctrine. See, e.g., People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340
Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930); People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393,
398, 49 N.E.2d 498, 500 (1943).
81. See Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1961) (Douglas, Circuit Justice);
Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM (Ten-Year Report 1961-1971) (1972).
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system to testify. But most courts hold that they have no power to
compel a person to speak to litigants in an out-of-court interview, for




The contempt power has also been limited to controlling persons
within the judicial system. Judicial treatment of this limitation has
historically revolved around state and federal court interpretations of
the federal contempt statute passed in 1831.8 3 Early interpretation of
the statute narrowly construed it as limiting application of the con-
tempt power to persons who acted disruptively within the courthouse
and surrounding areas.84 State courts often adopted this interpretation
as the appropriate limitation on their contempt powers 5 Toward the
end of the nineteenth century, however, the federal courts-followed
by state courts-reinterpreted the statute to permit the exercise of the
contempt power against almost any behavior which might interfere
with the administration of justice, regardless of the location of the
alleged contemnor.80 But in its 1941 decision in Nye v. United
States,87 the Supreme Court rejected the broad turn-of-the-century in-
terpretation. The Nye Court concluded that the underlying history
and policy of contempt could best be effectuated by interpreting the
statute as the courts originally had: only conduct within the area of
the courthouse should be subject to sanction.88
Just as the state courts had followed the federal courts' turn-of-the-
century use of a broad contempt power, many state courts have
followed the Nye Court's lead in restricting the contempt power to
82. See Byrnes' v. United States, 327 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
970 (1964) (no error in witnesses' not talking with defendant since "any witness has the
right to refuse to be interviewed, if he so desires"); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 134, 140, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (1957) (court has no power to compel witnesses to
speak out of court); cf. State v. Chaney, 5 Ariz. App. 530, 535, 428 P.2d 1004, 1009 (1967)
(prosecutor may not discourage witnesses from talking to defendant out of court, but
most courts refuse to compel out-of-court interview); State v. Lampp, 155 So. 2d 10, 12
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (not error to deny defendant's request to talk to witness in
out-of-court interview). But see Wisniewski v. State, 51 Del. 84, 92, 138 A.2d 333, 338
(1957) (dictum) (asserting that defendant should have been allowed to speak with witness
prior to trial).
83. 4 Stat. 487, ch. 99 (1831) (current, version at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970)). See Hudon,
supra note 65, at 16; Nelles & King, supra note 30, at 532-43.
84. See Nelles &- King, supra note 30, at 530-32.
85. Id. at 533.
86. Id. at 537-43.
87. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
88. Id. at 48; see Hudon, supra note 65, at 16.
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misbehavior within the courthouse area. For example, some state
courts, as well as the federal courts, deny themselves authority to hold
police in contempt for out-of-court misconduct such as divulging in-
formation to the press. Courts reject the power even though they
recognize that such dissemination of information may make it more
difficult for them to satisfy their obligation to provide fair trials.89
The federal courts and those state courts that adhere to the narrow
Nye interpretation of the contempt power do not employ contempt
by publication." They recognize that the major objective of Congress
in passing the 1831 federal contempt statute was to prevent punish-
ment of newspapers for out-of-court publications. 91 But some state
courts have continued to employ contempt by publication after Nye.9 2
These courts rely upon the doctrine of constructive contempt,93 a
doctrine that historically has been applied primarily to contempt by
publication.94 By not recognizing spatial limitations on the contempt
power, this doctrine enables courts to circumvent the requirement that
contempt be applied only to obstructions in the presence of the court.95
By denominating this doctrinal exception "constructive" contempt, the
courts seemingly have recognized the extent to which it represents a
departure from the established limitation of controlling only behavior
before the court.
89. E.g., State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 34-35, 139 N.WV.2d 490, 514 (1966) ("Police
officers, over whom we have no . . .disciplinary power, ought ... to be dealt with by
their superior officers ...."); State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965) ("Control of [improper police dissemination of
information] is largely in the hands of the prosecutor and local police authorities.") See
MEDUNA REPORT, supra note 6, at 40-41; T. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 128, 154-55, 164-65
(discussing Van Duyne and REARDON REPORT).
90. See Goss v. Illinois, 204 F. Supp. 268, 274 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd on other grounds,
312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 22, at 298; MEDINA
RLPORT, supra note 6, at 2-3.
91. Nelles and King concluded that the "moving purpose [behind passage of the federal
contempt statute] was to exclude from summary punishment all publications out of
court ...." Nelles &: King, supra note 30, at 532.
92. E.g., People v. Goss, 10 II1. 2d 533, 538-39, 548, 141 N.E.2d 385, 387-88, 391-92
(1937) (per curiam) (finding contempt conviction justified but reversing on procedural
ground-); Ex parte Craig, 150 Tex. Crim. 598, 618, 193 S.W.2d 178, 190 (1946) (per curiam),
rev'd sub noir. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (adopting opinion of Commission
of Appeals upholding contempt by publication based upon inherent powers).
93. E.g., Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 322-23, 67 A.2d 497, 506-07
(1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (acknowledging inherent power of constructive
contempt for out-of-court reporting, but reversing contempt conviction on First Amend-
mnent grounds); Ex parte Craig, 150 Tex. Crim. 598, 608, 193 S.W.2d 178, 184 (1946) (per
curiam), rev'd sub non. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (adopting Commission of
Appeals' opinion holding newspapers in constructive contempt for publications about
trial).
94. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 69.
95. Id. at 78, 80-89.
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C. Separation of Powers
The courts have exercised their inherent power in a manner con-
sistent with two central components of the separation of powers doc-
trine. They have affirmatively employed inherent powers to enable the
judiciary to perform its function independently of the legislative and
executive branches, and they have limited the exercise so as not to
usurp the prerogatives of the other branches. 0
1. Procurement
Courts exercise the procurement power consistently with the separa-
tion of power doctrine, primarily because this power is a crucial means
of maintaining judicial independence. Without a judicial procure-
ment power, the legislature or executive could cripple the judiciary by
denying the courts supplies and personnel with which to operate. 7
The courts have limited themselves, however, to procuring only
those services and items used in performing their function of ad-
judicating cases. For example, in Allen v. Payne"5 the California
Supreme Court held that a grand jury could not hire its own criminal
investigator. Such activity was held to be within the province of the
executive branch. Similarly, since appointment of executive or legisla-
tive officers would interfere with those branches' prerogatives to ap-
point their own officers, courts have refrained from appointing public
prosecutors where to do so would encroach upon executive functions. 9
96. For discussions of the separation of powers doctrine, see, e.g., National Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949); A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953); Note, The
Special Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, I1 AM. CR1M. L. REv. 577, 614-20
(1973).
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197,
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) ("[T]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to
... compel payment of those sums ... necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities
. . . if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent Branch of our Government."); State
ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 379, 68 P. 689, 690 (1902) (per curian) ("If this
[nonjudicial] board has the absolute control, . . . then, by refusing to furnish the court
room with a stove or other means of heating, could it obstruct the court in its jurisdic-
tion during a greater part of each year."); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, § 2.3, Com-
mentary at 38.
98. 1 Cal. 2d 607, 36 P.2d 614 (1934).
99. See, e.g., In re Ringwood Fact Finding Comm., 65 N.J. 512, 536, 324 A.2d 1, 14
(1974) (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he court's concern
for the conduct of all aspects of the 'judicial powers' will not justify the encroachment
upon an inherently executive function."); Smith v. Gallagher, 409 Pa. 551, 583, 185 A.2d
135, 151 (1962) ("No judge may dictatorially order [an elected prosecutor] to refrain from
doing his work.") But cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-276, 282 (1977) (statutory authority for
judicial appointment of prosecuting attorneys as members of judicial department).
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2. Rulemaking
The judicial rulemaking function has also remained consistent with
the separation of powers doctrine. Judicial rules support judicial in-
dependence-an independence that would be threatened if the execu-
tive or legislature attempted to regulate how cases should be heard
and decided. Because judicial rules only regulate the functioning of
the judiciary and those individuals who invoke the judicial processes,
they clearly do not interfere with the functioning of the other branches
of government. 100
Although courts have generally exercised their rulemaking powers
consistently with this limitation, it is possible to hypothesize a judicial
rule ordering executive officers to perform their executive functions in
a particular manner. In a major decision discussing whether a court
could force a United States Attorney to sign an indictment under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Fifth Circuit noted the
separation of powers barrier to such an attempt to control the execu-
tive:
[I]t is as an officer of the executive department that [the United
States Attorney] exercises a discretion as to whether or not there
shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It follows, as an incident
of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not
to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of
the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions. 101
The courts would thus violate the separation of powers by creating
rules that interfere with the United States Attorney's discretion.
100. Bloniarz v. Roloson, 70 Cal. 2d 143, 147-48, 449 P.2d 221, 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 285,
287 (1969) ("[Elvery court of record has powers requisite to its proper functioning as an
independent constitutional department .... "); State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo.
769, 777, 174 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1943) (court has inherent power to "preserve its existence
and function as a court" without reliance on other branches, but unnecessarily employed
power here). Moreover, the courts have guarded against legislative or executive infringe-
ment of the judicial rulemaking prerogative. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 336 So. 2d 93, 95
(Fla. 1976) ("To permit a law to stand wherein the Legislature requires the destruction of
judicial records would permit an unconstitutional encroachment by the legislative branch
on the procedural responsibilities granted exclusively to this Court."); Holm v. State, 404
P.2d 740, 743 (Wyo. 1965) ("[I]t is not within the power of the legislature to prescribe
how courts shall perform their functions any more than courts can prescribe how the
legislature or executive officers shall perform their functions.")
101. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965) (footnote omitted) (judge could not require, under penalty of contempt, U.S.
Attorney to sign indictment).
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3. Contempt
The exercise of the contempt power has also been limited by the
separation of powers doctrine. As with the procurement and rulemak-
ing powers, courts view contempt as a means of ensuring judicial in-
dependence. Through contempt citations, courts can deter threats to
their operations;' 10 2 without the power of contempt, courts would be
beholden to the executive for protection. Moreover, because courts
employ contempt only to punish threats to the judicial system, the
use of the power does not impinge upon the prerogatives of the other
branches.
03
Although no reported case directly strikes down the use of the
judicial contempt power on separation of powers grounds, 04 courts
have recognized the existence of this limitation. Earlier it was noted
that in Nye the Supreme Court held that the contempt power could
only be employed to punish misbehavior in or near the courthouse. 10
In reaching this result, the Court suggested that use of the contempt
power when the court was not threatened directly would in effect
create a judicial law, that is, a law that would permit the punishment
of a person even though the legislature had passed no criminal
statute.00 Perhaps because of their recognition of this problem, courts
have not employed the contempt power in a manner that would
invade the legislative province to make laws and thus violate the
separation of powers.
102. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) ("For
while it is sparingly to be used, yet the power of courts to punish for contempts is
a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely es-
sential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law.")
103. Cf. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 40 (noting that separation of powers problems
have not arisen in contempt context because of branches' respect for one another).
104. Id.
105. See p. 360 supra.
106. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-53 (1941). The Supreme Court more directly
noted the possibility of separation of powers problems in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S.
521, 543-44 (1917). The Court noted that in a few cases of the use of legislative con-
tempt,
the distinction was overlooked which existed between the legislative power to make
criminal every form of act which can constitute a contempt to be punished accord-
ing to the orderly process of law and the accessory implied power to deal with
particular acts as contempts outside of the ordinary process of law because of the
effect such particular acts may have in preventing the exercise of legislative authority.
Id. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 742 (1971) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) ("It would . . . be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers
for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has
specifically declined to prohibit.")
364
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IV. Protective Orders Against the Press: Transcending the
Limitations on Inherent Powers
A. Protective Orders and the Three Limitations
In exercising the inherent powers of procurement, rulemaking, and
contempt, the courts generally remain within the conceptual confines
of reasonable necessity, the judicial system, and the separation of
powers doctrine. When an exercise appears to exceed these limitations,
the courts have developed an exception, such as constructive contempt,
that acknowledges the limitations from which it departs. The issuance
of protective orders against the press, however, exceeds the scope of at
least two of the limitations without acknowledgment of doing so. Nor
has any court attempted to rationalize or to justify this extension of
inherent powers.
1. Reasonable Necessity
It is possible to construct a situation in which issuance of a protec-
tive order would be reasonably necessary to aid the courts in providing
a fair trial. Indeed, not only have courts traditionally restricted issuance
of protective orders to situations in which other techniques will not
ensure a fair trial,'07 but also the First Amendment requires that the
issuance of protective orders be limited to such cases. Thus, Nebraska
Press Association held that a protective order might be permissible if
no other methods are adequate to protect against a great likelihood
that an unfair trial will occur.'08 Consequently, any protective order
that would satisfy the present First Amendment standard would also
satisfy the requirement that there be a reasonable necessity for the
invocation of the inherent powers.
Because courts have focused exclusively on the First Amendment
implications of protective orders, the courts have not addressed them-
selves to the other limitations on the exercise of inherent powers. Even
if the reasonable necessity barrier is overcome, protective orders would
still exceed the other two judicially established restrictions upon in-
herent powers.
107. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1976) (for First Amend-
ment reasons, courts must utilize other techniques before issuing protective order); State
ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 910 (Fla. 1977) (same).
108. 427 U.S. at 570.
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2. Controlling the Judicial System
As developed above, courts have traditionally limited the exercise of
inherent powers to controlling persons and processes within the ju-
dicial system. In contrast, protective orders prohibit conduct outside
the judicial system. 109 The contrast is illustrated by comparing protec-
tive orders against the press with sequestration of the jury. Like
protective orders, sequestration prevents prejudicial publicity from
reaching jurors."10 But sequestration insulates jurors from outside in-
fluences by regulating the conduct of the jurors; sequestration does
not control conduct outside the judicial system that might affect the
trial atmosphere."' Consequently, sequestration remains within the
limited authority of the court to control its own operations."1
2
Protective orders against the press, however, regulate conduct out-
side the judicial system. Unlike a rule dictating where news representa-
tives sit in the courtroom, protective orders regulate what the news
media may publish or broadcast outside the courtroom. MN'oreover,
judicial theories that extend the "judicial system" beyond the physical
limits of the courtroom do not apply in the protective order context.
Unlike trial participants," :, representatives of the news media are not
generally involved in the ongoing litigation. And unlike persons prac-
ticing law," 4 members of the media are not officers of the courts. In-
deed, the First Amendment contemplates that the press will remain
independent of the courts."15 Significantly, bailbondsmen and police
are far more directly involved in judicial proceedings than are mem-
109. Moreover, in issuing protective orders, the judiciary interferes with a private in-
stitution-the press-whose independence under our constitutional scheme has been
recognized. See Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune
Co., 307 F. Supp. 422, 426-27 (N.D. 111. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Stewart, supra note 27, at 633-34.
110. See Hines v. United States, 365 F.2d 649, 651 (10th Cir. 1966) (sequestration helps
"protect the jury . . . from any interference"); United States v. Panczko, 353 F.2d 676,
678 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966) (failure of court to sequester jurors
overnight is prejudicial because it exposed them to outside information); McCarthy,
supra note 30, at 88.
111. See Note, Sequestration: A Possible Solution to the Free Press-Fair Trial Dilenma,
23 ANi. U.L. REv. 923, 933-34 (1974).
112. See State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 909
(Fla. 1977) (sequestration of jury within inherent power of courts); Steckler, Management
of the Jury, Seminar on Practice and Procedure, in 28 F.R.D. 37, 190 (1960) ("Funda-
mentally, the management of the jury as to matters which are not regulated by precise
statute or rule, is within the discretion of the presiding judge.")
113. See note 2 supra.
114. See note 68 supra.
115. Stewart, supra note 27, at 633-34.
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bers of the media. Yet the courts eschew power to regulate bondsmen
and police conduct out of court. 116
3. Separation of Powers
Protective orders against the press also contravene the separation of
powers doctrine. The issuance of the orders involves the courts in
regulating business activity rather than adjudicating cases before the
116. See pp. 359, 361 supra.
Nor can the constructive contempt, see p. 361 & notes 92-95 supra, exception be
extended to justify protective orders. Even if one were to accept the courts' theory of
constructive contempt, it does not apply to protective orders. By holding a publisher in
contempt because his newspaper has disrupted the courtroom, a court in effect punishes
the publisher for disseminating information to trial participants. Yet protective orders
issue before there has been any disruptive effect upon the courts by the publication of
information.
Moreover, the constructihe contempt theory should be abandoned in the contempt by
publication context for four reasons. First, the constructive contempt rationalization arose
as a result of an historical mistake when a judge sought to punish a publisher who had
insulted the judge's mentor. See note 30 supra. Acknowledging the weak historical founda-
tions of the constructive contempt theory, the Supreme Court and modern scholars hae
rejected it as inconsistent both with the common law tradition of contempt and with
the policies that warrant the judicial contempt power. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 263-68 (1941); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-52 (1941); A. FRIENDLY & R.
GOLDFARB, supra note 22, at 276-77. The courts should reject such a misguided doctrine,
not extend its use.
Second, the constructive contempt theory greatly expands the contempt power by
ignoring the actor's location and focusing on the effect of the actor's conduct upon the
court. The courts could extend control oser anyone whose conduct affected court pro-
ceedings and thereby would fail to limit the use of what they recognize to be a perilous
power requiring limitation. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1958) (Black,
J., dissenting) (contempt power is anomaly in law because circumvents protections of Bill
of Rights); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911) (contempt
power must be utilized cautiously). As one commentator has written, "through the
exercise of the constructive contempt power, courts have been able to go beyond the
judicial world and exercise their controls oser areas otherwise tangential to the judicial
process." R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 78.
Third, the courts' use of the constructive contempt theory in the protective order con-
text is inconsistent with the courts' refusal to control the conduct of persons more
directly involved in the judicial process. For instance, courts will not control the out-of-
court behavior of police and bailbondsmen; yet police and bailbondsmen conduct directly
affects and is affected by judicial proceedings, while the press deals with the courts
only as a source of news.
Fourth, the constructive contempt doctrine in effect renders the press a part of the
judicial system. Under the theory any time media publicity is heard or seen by court-
room participants, the court can exert control over the press. But the First Amendment
requires that the press remain an independent critic of government. See Stewart, supra
note 27, at 633-34.
The subpoena power constitutes an exception to the courts' general adherence to the
limitation of controlling only persons within the judicial system. See note 76 supra. The
courts justify this exception by arguing that testifying is a duty of living in society; the
individual has in effect "consented" to the interference as the price of gaining societal
benefits. This explanation cannot be applied to the press, for the public duty of the
press according to the Constitution is to remain independent of government, not to
"consent" to infringements of the freedom of the press. See id.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 342, 1977
courts. Protective orders are broad commands issued to persons not
involved in litigation before the court. The press is not a party in the
criminal case, and protective orders usually are entered ex parte with-
out affording the press an opportunity to contest the issuance. 117 Even
when some representatives of the news media do appear before the
court, a subsequently issued order is generally not limited to them but
applies to all media." 8 The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Dickinson
has noted the nonjudicial nature of protective orders:
[The protective order] challenged in this case was not directed at
any named party or court official involved in the underlying
litigation, but rather it sought to control activities of non-parties
to the lawsuit ... in matters not going to the merits of the sub-
stantive issues of the ongoing trial or the court's ability to effectu-
ate any ultimate judgment on them." 9
Protective orders do not resolve a specific, disputed issue. Rather,
they regulate the news media's decision of what to print or broad-
117. See pp. 342-43 supra.
Justice Brennan has noted one detriment resulting from the lack of media representa-
tives:
Indeed, to the extent media notified of the restraint proceedings choose not to
appear in light of the cost and time potentially involved in overturning any restraint
ultimately imposed, there will be no presentation of the countervailing public interest
in maintaining a free flow of information, as opposed to the interests of prosecution,
defense, and judges in maintaining fair proceedings.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 608 n.35 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
The absence of media representatives is contrary to the theory of our adversary system,
which assumes that proper decisions will only be reached when opposing parties contest
disputes before a judicial referee. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
Further, it may be that judges tend to strike the balance against the press where no real
threat to the judiciary exists, since the interests in publication are not represented be-
fore the court. Barist, supra note 19, at 437-38; Forer, A Free Press and Fair Trial, 39
A.B.A•J. 800, 843 (1953).
118. See p. 342 & note 4 supra; Rendleman, Free Press-Fair Trial: Review of Silence
Orders, 52 N.C.L. REv. 127, 153 (1973) (footnote omitted) ("The order . . . takes on more
of the appearance of legislation if it is not limited to a specific group but purports to
bind anyone who might publish.")
The Nebraska Press Association Court observed that there was a severe problem in the
court's gaining jurisdiction over the media because they were generally not before the
court. 427 U.S. at 565-66 & n.9. The Nebraska Supreme Court had written:
The relators [members of the media], by their motion to intervene in State v.
Simants invoked and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the District Court.
... The order of the county court . . . purports to restrain "the news media." The
courts have no general power in any kind of case to enjoin or restrain "everybody."
Even when acting with jurisdiction in proper cases, orders must pertain to particular
persons or legal entities over whom the court has in some manner acquired juris-
diction.
The relators could have ignored the order . . ..
State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 795, 236 N.W.2d 794, 802 (1975), rev'd on other grounds
sub norn. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
119. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 508 (5th Cir. 1972).
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cast. 20 In issuing protective orders, courts thus exercise generalized
regulatory power, which the separation of powers scheme delegates to
the legislature and which the courts deny they possess. 121 In Nebraska
Press Association, the Supreme Court concluded that "even a cursory
examination suggests how awkwardly broad prior restraints on publica-
tion, directed not at named parties but at large, would fit into our
jurisprudence."'12
2
B. The Irresponsibility of Unexplained Inconsistency
Courts issue protective orders against the press even though such
orders exceed the limits that courts have traditionally placed upon their
inherent powers. Because courts establish the limits of their own in-
herent powers, they presumably could define the limits to include
protective orders. Yet courts have expanded the scope of their inherent
powers sub silentio. Although they have developed notions such as
constructive contempt to relate other exceptions to the traditional
limitations, courts have not done so with protective orders. Nor have
they offered a new theory of inherent powers or explained why the
traditional limitations should be ignored. Courts generally have failed
to examine the conflict between the traditional limitations and the
values of fair trial that call for extension of inherent power. Such a
failure of the courts is subject to criticism for three reasons.
The unexplained extension of power seemingly conflicts with the
usual assumption that judicial powers should be cautiously and care-
fully expanded. The courts have recognized that misuse of inherent
powers may lead to disrespect toward all judicial power. 123 As one
court noted, "[i]f, through lack of restraint and by attempting to in-
crease their powers unnecessarily, [courts] lose the respect which makes
them effective, they may soon find that, as a practical matter, even
powers that are now conceded to them, are unenforceable."' 124 Careful
and reasoned extension of inherent powers seems particularly im-
120. Yet Justice Stewart has argued that the media has a specially protected right to
be free of such interference, Stewart, supra note 27, at 633-34. See Chicago Joint Bd.,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 307 F. Supp. 422, 426-27 (N.D.
I11. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
121. See p. 357 supra; T. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 156-58; Barist, supra note 19,
at 451.
122. 427 U.S. at 566 n.10.
123. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911) (contempt
power must be utilized cautiously so courts do not assume excessive powers); Collins v.
Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 579, 87 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1949) (though properly employed here,
courts should limit their reliance upon inherent powers).
124. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 156, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1973) (up-
holding protective order against public prosecutor but rejecting protective order against
press).
369
The Yale Law Journal
portant where, as here, such extension burdens First Amendment
rights.
Second, the courts' casual disregard of their own limitations runs
counter to the generally held belief that courts should exercise rea-
soned judgment. In the scheme of the Founding Fathers the judiciary
was to "check" the excesses of the other branches by becoming a bul-
wark against arbitrary and tyrannical government. To avoid becoming
an instrument of, rather than protector against, arbitrary government,
courts would have to follow principled rules in exercising their
power.125 Courts act in an unprincipled manner when they violate
well-established limitations by issuing protective orders. They com-
pound the error by failing to explain their actions.
Finally, the unexplained manner in which courts have extended
their power militates against acceptance of the scope of the power. In
criticizing the courts for inconsistent and unexplained sentencing
decisions, Judge Frankel has written:
But the absence, or refusal, of reasons is a hallmark of injustice.
[T]he swift ukase, without explanation, is the tyrant's way.
The despot is not bound by rules. He need not justify or account
for what he does.
People in prison and students outside react with solidly
grounded sentiments of cynicism and rage. Secret decisions bear
no credentials of care or legitimacy.
12-,
In contrast, a process of thoughtful consideration would likely elicit
greater deference for the courts' power.' 27 Moreover, the courts' ex-
125. See generally THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (Hamilton) 521, 522-24 (. Cooke ed. 1961);
id. No. 51 (Madison) 347, 349-50.
The idea that goernment should be bound by rules was at the very foundation of the
Founding Fathers' conception of the proper form of a limited government. John Adams,
later identified with those supporting a strong central government, observed that "good
government is an empire of laws." 4 C.F. ADAMS, THE WoRs oF JOHN ADAMIS 194 (Boston
1851). He wrote in the Massachusetts Constitution: "A frequent recurrence to the
fundamental principles of the constitution [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the ad-
vantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government. . . . [The people] have a right to
require of their lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observance of them
.. . ." Id. at 227-28. For a discussion of the usefulness of giving reasons in the context of
judicial sentencing, see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENcES 39-40 (1973); Kutak & Gottschalk,
In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NED.
L. REv. 463, 496-99 (1974).
126. M. FRANKEL, supra note 125, at 39, 49. Frankel also wrote: "The splatter of varied
sentences, with the unexplained variations left to be seen as random or worse, nourishes
the view that there is no justice in the law." Id. at 44. Moreover, "the characteristic
failure of those in power to explain or account . . . is perhaps the most vivid evidence
of fundamental lawlessness." Id. at 49.
127. See United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1973) (vacating sen-
tence since trial judge's failure to explain decision made decision look random rather
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planation might demonstrate that the extension of power best ac-
commodates societal goals and therefore should be respected. 128 As one
distinguished appellate court concluded in 1970:
Reasoned decision promotes results in the public interest by re-
quiring the [decisionmaker] to focus on the values served by its
decision, and hence releasing the clutch of unconscious preference
and irrelevant prejudice. It furthers the broad public interest of
enabling the public to repose confidence in the process as well as
the judgments of its decision-makers. 129
If the courts are to extend their authority, they should do so thought-
fully and explicitly. Only in this way can courts produce a rational and
acceptable decision consonant with fundamental American beliefs
about the judiciary.
than well-founded); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852-53 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (FCC adequately explained its decision, thus
enabling public to believe Commission acted thoughtfully).
128. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-73 (1975) (court could not determine
quality of agency decision when no explanation given); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196-97 (1947) ("If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which
it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable.
It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's
action ...."); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1973) (vacating
sentence: "Had the court below stated reasons for denial of the motion [for reduced
sentence] or, in the alternative, disclosed in 'some greater detail the basis for imposing
the rather long sentence, the posture of this appeal might well be different.") But cf.
Note, Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial Review under Title IV' of the
LMRDA: A Proposal for Administrative Reform, 86 YALE L.J. 885, 896-900, 911 n.106
(1977) (arguing that Bachowski reasons statements do little to allay suspicions about Labor
Department decisions).
129. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (footnote omitted).
